DOJ Withholds Rights Restoration Records Citing Privacy Concerns

What criteria must citizens seeking similar relief need to meet to prove themselves eligible for equal treatment? (img Duncan Johnson)

A June 15 letter to attorney Stephen Stamboulieh from the Department of Justice confirms DOJ is digging in against providing records responsive to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning the restoration of firearm rights to individuals who have been identified as eligible.

“We previously provided you with an interim response on March 26, 2026. We have now completed the processing of an additional fourteen pages of material responsive to your request,” Senior Counsel Vanessa R. Brinkmann advises.  “At this time, I have determined that all fourteen pages should be withheld in full pursuant to Exemption 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Please be advised that we have considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing records and applying FOIA exemption.”

DOJ is trying to close the door on a request submitted in April of last year that attempted to determine DOJ decision-making criteria when it identified 10 individuals, including actor/director Mel Gibson, for firearms restoration. Because it’s so easy to end up on the prohibited persons list (including the innocent pleading out to avoid great expense and threatened draconian punishment if they lose), it seemed in the interests of gun owners to know what criteria were used and who is likely to be eligible for consideration.

The FOIA request was an attempt to determine how those particular individuals were selected in order to clarify how other citizens could be included, by asking for:

All records “reviewed” by the Attorney General for each individual listed in the filing;

All records “that each individual submitted” to receive relief under 18 U.S.C. 925(c); and

All other records not “submitted” by the list of individuals but relied upon by the Attorney General in establishing that “each individual will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief to each individual would not be contrary to the public interest.”

Since the government did not respond to the request in the time required by law, a complaint was filed last Sept. 25 in the United States District Court in the District of Columbia asking the court to order DOJ to conduct a responsive search, produce non-exempt records and enjoin DOJ from continuing to withhold records.

“No response is required…  Plaintiff is not entitled to compel the production of any record… This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction… Plaintiff is neither eligible for nor entitled to attorney’s fees [and] Plaintiff’s request is improper to the extent is it unduly burdensome,” US Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro and Assistant US Attorney John J. Pardo  argued in the Department’s answer, filed Dec. 19.

Despite that court filing, Brinkmann’s March interim response indicated they had identified such records. Her latest reply now tells us they won’t provide them.

The thing is, the FOIA request never asked for anything that was not a matter of nonexempt record and that would be violative of privacy rights, and the intent behind the effort was simply to help determine what criteria citizens seeking similar relief would need to meet to prove themselves eligible for equal treatment.

While, per the Office of the Pardon Attorney, the proposed rule has been published in the Federal Register and the comment period is over, a final rule with procedures to petition for rights restoration and an online application form have yet to be issued. And while it’s true the proposed rule offers generic guidance on eligibility, the devil is in the details:

Under § 107.1(7) and (8) of the proposed rule, those convicted of certain serious offenses that are not the violent or sexual offenses discussed above, may be considered for relief 10 years after the completion of their sentences based on their individualized circumstances without triggering the presumptive disqualification set forth in this rule. For all other offenses, as specified in § 107.1(a)(9), the Department has selected a presumptively disqualifying time-period of 5 years based on a review of the research and a need to balance public safety with individual rights.

In terms of rendering a decision, things get amorphous.

“The Attorney General may consider the elements of the statute of conviction and conclude that those elements, standing alone, necessarily match the offenses listed in the proposed rule and thereby presumptively render relief to be not in the interest of public safety,” the proposed rule states. “The rule also would clarify that the Attorney General’s decision whether to grant relief will be based on all the relevant circumstances, rather than a blindered approach that looks only at the facts that led to the applicant’s federal firearm disability.”

That could make ensuring equivalent outcomes problematic. Noting “the Department estimates that approximately 1 million people will apply for relief [estimated at $20 per application] within the first year of the program” requiring “50 FTE [Full-Time Equivalent] personnel,” there will be much room for variations. The need to apply consistent criteria is not only a matter of basic fairness, but of law.

That’s why release of requested records, without disclosing exempt information, will help ensure that, and DOJ’s blanket refusal,  by claiming doing so would be  “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” seems more a hollow deflection than anything else. After all, it was the administration that released their names to the public in what was clearly to its political advantage by appealing to the “gun voters” it relies on.

In terms of continuing with this complaint, attorney Stamboulieh is working with DOJ on the next steps. Further developments will be reported in this column.

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About David Codrea:

David Codrea is the winner of multiple journalist awards for investigating/defending the RKBA and a long-time gun owner rights advocate who defiantly challenges the folly of citizen disarmament. He blogs at “The War on Guns: Notes from the Resistance,” is a regularly featured contributor to Firearms News, and posts on Twitter: @dcodrea and Facebook.

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Tennessee Fights to Revive “Going Armed” Law After Court Rules It Unconstitutional

Tennessee’s attempt to revive two gun-control statutes moved to the Court of Appeals on June 23, 2026, as judges heard argument in Stephen L. Hughes, et al. v. Bill Lee, et al., a major right-to-carry case challenging the state’s “Going Armed” law and its ban on carrying firearms in many public recreational areas.

The case stems from a ruling by a special three-judge Chancery Court panel that declared Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(a)(1), the state’s “Going Armed” statute, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1311(a), the Parks Statute, unconstitutional, void, and of no effect.

At issue is whether Tennessee can continue treating ordinary public carry as a criminal offense under a vague “intent to go armed” theory, and whether the state can broadly prohibit carry across large areas of public land. For gun owners, the case is about far more than technical statutory language. It is about whether Tennessee’s carry laws can survive the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment test after Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi.

The laws are leftovers from the Reconstruction era, when they were designed to keep freed slaves and other disfavored groups disarmed.  Here is a link to a copy of the order of the three judge panel.

Three-Judge Panel Ruled the Statutes Unconstitutional

The case was filed as a civil lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the two statutes. The case was referred from the Chancery Court in Gibson County. Chancery Courts in Tennessee are equity courts. They do not hear criminal cases. The Gibson County Court referred the case to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which created a three judge panel Chancery Court, as required by Tennessee law, specifically to hear civil cases challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee statutes.

The Supreme Court created the three judge panel to hear the case in accordance with Rule 54, as meeting the requirements of a civil challenge that:

(1) challenges the constitutionality of a state statute, including a statute that apportions or redistricts state legislative or congressional districts; or an executive order; or an administrative rule or regulation; and

(2) includes a claim for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief;

The three judge Chancery Court, created by the Supreme Court, held for the plaintiffs the challenged statutes were facially invalid. They infringed on rights protected by the Second Amendment. From the last page of the opinion:

 “For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. As a result, the Going Armed Statute, Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39 J7-l307(a),38 and the Parks Statute, Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-17-131 J(a), are hereby DECLARED unconstitutional, void, and of no effect.”

State Argues Jurisdiction and Facial-Challenge Issues

The State of Tennessee appealed the decision. It is the oral arguments of the appeal which were heard on June 23, 2026. Judge Andy D. Bennet asked most of the questions.

Mr. Edwin A. Groves, Jr. submitted oral arguments for the state. The major argument appeared to be a claim the Chancery Court does not have jurisdiction in the case. The claim was Chancery Courts cannot hear criminal cases. But, the case is a civil challenge to the validity of a criminal statute, not a criminal case. The Supreme Court appointed the panel.  Judge Bennet appeared skeptical of the idea the Supreme Court would appoint a court without jurisdiction in the case.

Mr. Groves also claimed the Appellees could not win a facial challenge, because the laws could apply to “dangerous and unusual weapons” and/or that the intent to go armed could mean the same as going armed to the terror of the public.

Judge Bennet asked if the case is about the Second Amendment, because the Tennessee Constitution cannot have less protection than the Second Amendment. This clarified the merits of the case were about infringements on the Second Amendment.

John I. Harris, III. gave the oral arguments for the appellees. He first decreed this was a civil case, not a criminal case, and the three judge Chancery court had jurisdiction. Then he made clear the statutes in question infringed on Second Amendment rights.  He cited law to the effect states may not use procedural mechanisms to defeat a right the federal courts would uphold.

Harris also stated the Supreme Court in Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi held the fringe issues of “Dangerous and unusual weapons” or “going armed to the terror” of the public did not invalidate the facial challenge, because they did not invalidate the challenge in the Supreme Court decisions Heller, Bruen, or Rahimi.

It is difficult to understand why the State of Tennessee is challenging the three judge Chancery court on this issue. The Tennessee statutes clearly infringe on Second Amendment rights. The State is primarily arguing procedural issues. It is difficult to see how this benefits Governor Lee or the State of Tennessee.

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About Dean Weingarten:

Dean Weingarten has been a peace officer, a military officer, was on the University of Wisconsin Pistol Team for four years, and was first certified to teach firearms safety in 1973. He taught the Arizona concealed carry course for fifteen years until the goal of Constitutional Carry was attained. He has degrees in meteorology and mining engineering, and retired from the Department of Defense after a 30 year career in Army Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation.

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Supreme Court’s Wolford Decision Could Blow A Hole In New Jersey’s AR-15 Ban Defense

The Supreme Court’s Wolford decision could reshape how courts review New Jersey’s ban on so-called assault firearms. img Duncan Johnson

The Supreme Court’s decision in Wolford v. Lopez was about Hawaii’s attempt to turn most private property open to the public into gun-free zones by default. But the ruling may have just handed gun owners in New Jersey a powerful new weapon in the fight against the state’s ban on so-called “assault firearms.”

On June 26, attorneys for the Cheeseman plaintiffs in Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Attorney General notified the Third Circuit that Wolford directly affects the pending challenge to New Jersey’s semiautomatic firearm ban.

Their point is simple: New Jersey cannot force gun owners to prove at the starting line that banned firearms are “in common use” before the Second Amendment even applies. Under Wolford, the first question is much more basic.

Does the law regulate “Arms”? If yes, the Constitution is already in play.

We just filed this letter with the Third Circuit in our lawsuit challenging New Jersey’s “assault weapon” ban, where we argue that yesterday’s Wolford decision strengthens our case: https://t.co/XrjnZkKX5L pic.twitter.com/LGzUorELot

— Firearms Policy Coalition (@gunpolicy) June 26, 2026

Wolford Reaffirms The Plain Text Test

Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the Court in Wolford, explained that Bruen’s first step asks whether the law falls within the Second Amendment’s plain text. That includes whether the law concerns “Arms,” meaning weapons “customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes,” according to the Court.

Phrasing matters. The Second Amendment does not protect only whatever gun a state lawyer is willing to admit is useful for home defense. It does not protect only handguns. It does not protect only muskets. It protects “Arms.” And Wolford confirms that the category includes weapons customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes. That is a problem for New Jersey.

That matters in Cheeseman because New Jersey’s ban plainly regulates firearms. Not accessories. Not conduct divorced from arms. Firearms.

The Cheeseman letter seizes on that language, telling the Third Circuit that “the only predicate question” is whether the law concerns “Arms.” The plaintiffs argue that the answer is “beyond dispute,” meaning the Second Amendment presumptively protects possession of the banned firearms. From there, the burden shifts to New Jersey.

That is the part anti-gun states hate. They want gun owners trapped in a never-ending preliminary debate over whether AR-15s, modern semiautomatic rifles, and similar arms are common enough, useful enough, or favored enough by judges to count. Wolford makes that harder.

New Jersey’s Common-Use Argument Takes A Hit

New Jersey has argued that “common use” belongs at the threshold stage of the case. In other words, the state wants courts to ask whether the banned arms are common before deciding whether the Second Amendment applies.

The Cheeseman plaintiffs say Wolford rejects that exact move.

Quoting Wolford, the letter notes that such considerations are “out of place at Bruen’s first step.” At that stage, the Court said, the question is whether the law falls within the Second Amendment’s “plain text.” That distinction is critical.

Common use still matters, but not the way New Jersey wants it to matter. Under Heller and Bruen, the government may try to defend a ban by proving the arms are “dangerous and unusual.” But that is the government’s burden. It is not supposed to be a precondition gun owners must satisfy before their rights are recognized.

New Jersey does not get to say, “Prove your guns are protected before we have to justify banning them.” Wolford says the plain text comes first.

Barrett’s Concurrence Makes The Point Even Sharper

Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence is also important for Cheeseman. She warned against letting governments “smuggle additional limits” into the plain-text stage of Second Amendment analysis.

That is exactly what New Jersey appears to be trying to do. If a state can redefine Bruen step one by importing parts of the historical analysis into the threshold question, then the government can water down the Second Amendment before the real test even begins.

That gives the Cheeseman plaintiffs a clean response. The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” Once a ban targets arms and restricts possession, the state has to justify the restriction through history and tradition.

Jackson’s Dissent Helps Clarify The Fight

Interestingly, the Cheeseman letter also points to Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent. Jackson disagreed with the majority’s application of Bruen, but she described the majority’s rule as requiring courts to look only to the Second Amendment’s “plain text” at step one.

That matters because even the dissent understood what the majority had done. Wolford separates the plain-text inquiry from the historical-analogue inquiry. The plaintiffs in Cheeseman are now telling the Third Circuit to apply that separation to New Jersey’s rifle ban.

The End of Assault Weapon Bans?

Wolford was not an “assault weapon” case, and it did not directly decide whether bans on AR-15s are unconstitutional. But Supreme Court decisions often reshape pending cases by clarifying the test lower courts must use.

Here, the clarification is bad news for New Jersey.

Modern semiautomatic rifles are unquestionably “Arms.” They are weapons. They are owned by millions of Americans. They are used for lawful purposes, including self-defense, training, competition, and home protection. Under Wolford, that should be enough to trigger Second Amendment protection at the plain-text stage.

Then New Jersey must prove its ban fits the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. That is where these bans have always been weakest. There is no founding-era tradition of banning an entire class of commonly owned firearms because politicians dislike their appearance, features, or popularity.

The Third Circuit now has fresh Supreme Court guidance sitting directly in front of it.

For New Jersey gun owners, Wolford may not be the final shot in Cheeseman. But it may have just made the state’s job a whole lot harder.

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About Duncan Johnson:

Duncan Johnson is a lifelong firearms enthusiast and unwavering defender of the Second Amendment—where “shall not be infringed” means exactly what it says. A graduate of George Mason University, he enjoys competing in local USPSA and multi-gun competitions whenever he’s not covering the latest in gun rights and firearm policy. Duncan is a regular contributor to AmmoLand News and serves as part of the editorial team responsible for AmmoLand’s daily gun-rights reporting and industry coverage.

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Supreme Court Says Courts Can’t Smuggle Gun Control Into Bruen Step One

The Supreme Court’s Wolford v. Lopez ruling did more than strike down Hawaii’s “vampire law.” It warned lower courts not to smuggle gun-control arguments into Bruen Step One before the government has to prove a historical tradition. IMG Scott Witner

The Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark ruling in Wolford v. Lopez that struck down Hawaii’s so-called “vampire law,” but the decision’s impact extends far beyond that single victory. The opinion provides crucial clarification that lower courts cannot employ certain procedural strategies to evade rulings against restrictive gun control measures.

On the surface, Wolford addresses whether private property owners must post “gun welcome” signs before individuals may lawfully carry firearms on their premises. However, like many other landmark Second Amendment decisions, Wolford transcends this narrow issue. It delivers important guidance on how courts must properly apply the constitutional framework established in Bruen and Heller.

Bruen Step One Just Got Harder to Beat

The most significant clarification is that courts may no longer shoehorn gun-control reasoning into Step One of the Bruen analysis.

Step One focuses strictly on the plain text of the Second Amendment. If the regulated individual is part of “the people” and the arm in question is “bearable,” the conduct is presumptively protected. Liberal courts have repeatedly attempted to dismiss cases at this early stage by asserting that certain popular arms, such as AR-15-style rifles, fall outside constitutional protection.

The Wolford decision firmly rejects this tactic, making clear that such maneuvering cannot be used to bypass Step Two’s historical-tradition analysis.

In Footnote 1, Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote: “No one disputes that the Second Amendment’s text has a fixed meaning that must be satisfied before a law is deemed presumptively unconstitutional.” She noted the disagreement centers on whether courts can improperly import additional limits from regulatory tradition into the plain-text inquiry. “The answer is and always has been no.”

Associate Justice Samuel Alito reinforced the two-step structure from Bruen, emphasizing that courts must first determine whether the challenged law implicates the core protections of the Amendment regarding “the people,” “keep[ing],” and “bear[ing]” Arms.

Another common tactic courts have used to uphold “assault weapons” bans is to claim that firearms like AR-15s are not “in common use” specifically for self-defense. In Heller, the Court held that arms in common use cannot be banned, yet anti-gun courts have tried to append “for self-defense” to narrow that protection. This strained interpretation has been deployed to justify not only bans on commonly owned rifles but also restrictions on magazines and other accessories.

What “Offensive or Defensive Purposes” Means for Gun Owners

Wolford firmly rejects this reasoning. It clarifies that the Second Amendment protects “weapons customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes,” not merely those carried for self-defense.

Heller never intended to confine the right to a narrow self-defense test; rather, it safeguards arms for all lawful purposes. Wolford confirms that bearable arms in common use are protected regardless of whether they are handguns or other types of firearms. A defensive firearm is one someone might carry outside the home for self-defense, such as a pistol that millions of Americans carry every day. Firearms kept mainly inside the home can be used for defensive purposes, but they can also be used legally for offensive purposes, such as clearing a house in case of an intruder. Also, guns like AR-15s can be used for hunting. This is not a defensive purpose. It is an offensive purpose.

Americans also have the right to bear arms to resist tyranny. In fact, that is the main purpose of the Second Amendment.

Wolford makes it clear these arms are protected under the Second Amendment and deviates from the anti-gun idea that the primary function of a gun must be for self-defense to be protected by the Second Amendment. Since many anti-gun defendants have argued that the Second Amendment only applies to firearms that are primarily used for self-defense, their arguments now fall short.

Thanks to this ruling, anti-gun courts will face significantly greater difficulty in upholding unconstitutional restrictions. By closing off these procedural loopholes, Wolford strengthens the Second Amendment’s safeguards and ensures more faithful application of constitutional text and history.

This opinion will have lasting ramifications far beyond Hawaii’s “vampire rule,” providing a powerful tool for defenders of the right to keep and bear arms across the country for years to come.

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About John Crump

Mr. Crump is an NRA instructor and a constitutional activist. John has written about firearms, interviewed people from all walks of life, and on the Constitution. John lives in Northern Virginia with his wife and sons, follow him on X at @right2bear, or at www.crumpy.com.

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Federal Judge Rules Jackson County’s Under-21 Handgun Ban Violated the Second Amendment

A federal judge ruled that Jackson County’s repealed under-21 handgun and ammunition ban violated the Second Amendment. iStock-1324734605

A federal judge from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division, has ruled that an ordinance banning anyone under 21 from buying handguns or handgun ammunition was unconstitutional.

In November 2024, Jackson County passed Ordinance No. 5865. Section 1 of the ordinance prohibited the sale or transfer of handguns and handgun ammunition to anyone under 21 (and purchase by those under 21). Section 3 prohibited individuals aged 18–20 from possessing semiautomatic assault rifles (with limited exceptions).

Leonard Wilson, Jr. (age 18 at filing), Gun Owners of America (GOA), Gun Owners Foundation (GOF), and the State of Missouri sued Jackson County, the County Sheriff, and the County Prosecutor in Leonard Wilson, Jr. et al. v. Jackson County, Missouri, et al. Wilson wanted to buy a handgun and ammunition from his uncle, but was blocked by the ordinance.

Shortly after the suit was filed in June 2025, the County repealed the Prior Ordinance and replaced it with a narrower Current Ordinance (Ordinance No. 6002) that only applies to minors under 18.

On February 10, 2026, the judge in the case dismissed GOF from the case for lack of standing. GOA was dismissed because the judge found the injunctive relief claims moot. He also dismissed Count III (state preemption) on supplemental jurisdiction grounds. The February 10 ruling left Wilson and the State with only claims for nominal damages on Counts I (Second Amendment) and II (vagueness).

Young Adults Are Protected by the Second Amendment

The court granted in part and deferred in part the motion on June 24, 2026. The Court ruled that Section 1 of the Prior Ordinance violated Wilson’s Second Amendment rights. The judge relied heavily on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024), which struck down a Minnesota law restricting 18–20-year-olds from obtaining permits to openly carry firearms. He ruled that people 18 and older are protected by the Second Amendment.

The judge found that age-based restrictions like this lack historical tradition under the Bruen framework. The right to keep and bear arms implies the right to acquire or purchase firearms; a ban on purchase is an indirect prohibition on possession.

The Court was not convinced that Wilson had standing to challenge the assault weapon provision of the ordinance and will address jurisdiction further.

The case is limited to nominal damages (symbolic compensation) for the constitutional violation of the repealed ordinance. The Defendants’ arguments, which attempted to distinguish Bruen and Worth (e.g., self-defense vs. range use, purchase vs. possession), were rejected by the judge. They tried to argue “common use for self-defense,” but the judge pushed back, pointing out that the United States Supreme Court said common use applies for “lawful purposes” and not just “self-defense.”

The judge wrote: “Defendants do not conduct their own Bruen analysis. They do not even mention Worth. Instead, they attempt to distinguish Bruen because of its discussion about the Second Amendment’s relation to the right to self-defense, whereas Wilson wants a handgun so he can shoot it at a firearms range. (Doc. 48, pp. 9-11.) However, nothing in Bruen, or any other case, holds that the Second Amendment applies only to people who want a firearm for self-defense.”

Even though the ordinance was repealed, this is still a victory for the Second Amendment. It shows that localities cannot pass an unconstitutional ordinance and then repeal it once sued to dodge responsibility.

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About John Crump

Mr. Crump is an NRA instructor and a constitutional activist. John has written about firearms, interviewed people from all walks of life, and on the Constitution. John lives in Northern Virginia with his wife and sons. Follow him on X at @right2bear or at www.crumpy.com.

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Virginia Assault Firearms Ban Blocked Statewide Until Dec. 31

A Virginia judge issued a statewide preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the Commonwealth’s assault-firearms ban until Dec. 31. IMG Duncan Johnson

A Virginia judge has issued a statewide preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the Commonwealth’s new ban on so-called “assault firearms” until December 31, 2026, handing Virginia gun owners a major victory just days before the law was scheduled to take effect.

The ruling came Thursday in Crump v. Katz, the state-court challenge to Gov. Abigail Spanberger’s sweeping gun-control package. The judge read the preliminary injunction from the bench and made clear that the assault-firearms ban is now enjoined statewide while the case proceeds.

The Commonwealth tried to limit the injunction to Lancaster County. The judge refused.

The state then asked the judge to stay his own ruling. He refused that, too.

That means the injunction is in effect now unless a higher court intervenes. Virginia’s assault-firearms ban is not merely delayed on paper. It is blocked statewide through Dec. 31.

John Crump Has Standing, GOA and VCDL Do Not

The court did narrow the case before granting relief. The judge held that Gun Owners of America and Virginia Citizens Defense League did not have standing, but found that individual plaintiff John Crump did. That finding kept the case alive.

Crump, an AmmoLand contributor and longtime Second Amendment journalist, challenged the law as a Virginia gun owner directly affected by the ban. The judge accepted that Crump had standing to sue, and that was enough for the court to reach the preliminary-injunction question.

The state may try to spin the standing ruling as a partial win because GOA and VCDL were knocked out at this stage. But the Commonwealth’s real goal was to keep the ban alive for July 1. It failed.

Judge Refuses County-Only Injunction

The statewide scope of the injunction is critical. Had the court limited relief to one county, Virginia gun owners would have been left with a confusing patchwork of rights depending on where they lived, traveled, bought, sold, trained, or competed. The judge rejected that approach and made the injunction statewide.

For gun owners, dealers, instructors, competitors, and families across Virginia, the practical effect is simple: the assault-firearms ban is blocked across the Commonwealth until Dec. 31, unless an appellate court steps in.

Virginia’s Gun Ban Hits Common Firearms

Virginia Democrats marketed the law as a public-safety measure. In reality, the ban targets ordinary Virginians. Virginians who own, buy, train with, and rely on commonly possessed firearms for lawful purposes.

These are not exotic weapons. They are firearms owned by millions of peaceable Americans for home defense, competition, training, collecting, and militia-suitable use.

Crump v. Katz challenges the Commonwealth’s attempt to restrict arms protected under Virginia’s own Constitution. Article I, Section 13 declares that “a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state.”

The state’s defense was revealing. Virginia argued that Article I, Section 13 is not an individual right like the Second Amendment, but instead a collective, militia-tethered provision. Put plainly, the Commonwealth claimed Virginians have less protection under their own constitution than Americans have under the federal Bill of Rights.

The court was not willing to let the assault-firearms ban take effect while that argument plays out.

A Major First-Round Win for Virginia Gun Owners

This is not the final ruling on the merits. A preliminary injunction does not end the case. The Commonwealth can still seek emergency appellate relief, and no one should expect Virginia’s gun-control machine to quit.

But Thursday’s ruling changes the battlefield.

The judge refused to shrink the injunction to one county. He refused to pause his own order. And he refused to let Richmond enforce its assault-firearms ban before the constitutional challenge is resolved.

The lesson for Richmond should be obvious: changing the label does not change the right. Calling a rifle an “assault firearm” does not make it unusual. Calling a gun ban “public safety” does not make it constitutional.

For now, Virginia’s assault-firearms ban is blocked statewide.

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About Duncan Johnson:

Duncan Johnson is a lifelong firearms enthusiast and unwavering defender of the Second Amendment—where “shall not be infringed” means exactly what it says. A graduate of George Mason University, he enjoys competing in local USPSA and multi-gun competitions whenever he’s not covering the latest in gun rights and firearm policy. Duncan is a regular contributor to AmmoLand News and serves as part of the editorial team responsible for AmmoLand’s daily gun-rights reporting and industry coverage.

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Supreme Court’s Hemani Ruling Spells Doom for Unlawful Red Flag Laws

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hemani repeatedly used the phrase “pre-deprivation process,” which should send shivers down the back of anti-gunners. The Court made clear Americans cannot lose their right to bear arms without a pre-deprivation hearing, yet that is the entire point of today’s red flag law movement.

Much of the coverage of the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Hemani focused on its holding: the federal ban on gun possession by users of illegal drugs, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), could not constitutionally be applied to a man whose only offense was unlawfully using marijuana. That result matters obviously. But within the Court’s opinion appeared a phrase that lands squarely against one of the anti-gun movement’s favorite weapons. The Court repeatedly referenced the concept of “pre-deprivation process.”

In other words, before an American may be disarmed by the government, there must be a pre-deprivation legal process during which the American can fight the attempt to disarm him. Properly understood and applied, this notion provides gun owners with a powerful argument against red flag laws.

The Historical Approach to Disarming a Dangerous Person

Let’s start with a distinction the red flag debate is designed to obscure. America has always had a way to deal with violent criminals (prison or death) and the dangerously mentally ill (civil commitment). The civil commitment process has been around for generations in every state. Unlike modern red flag laws, America’s commitment processes include robust due process protections designed to protect the individual and fundamental right to freedom against wrongful charges of mental incompetence. Some of those due process protections include the right to appointed legal counsel, expert witnesses, the right to confront witnesses, and setting the government’s burden of proof at the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” standard.

In contrast to civil commitment laws, modern red flag laws are designed to bypass the well-established due process protections of those accused of being dangerous to themselves or others. Red flag laws are specifically built to circumvent the usual due process protections of American gun owners. Red flag laws often allow courts to take one’s firearms away on an ex parte petition, which means without the gun owner first being able to fight the charge. There is no doubt that red flag laws are NOT about public safety, but are about subverting Second Amendment rights. That the only remedy arising from such laws is the confiscation of guns (not knives or cars, or a commitment to a mental institution) means the law reaches exactly one class of Americans: those who own guns.

In reality, if you are truly too dangerous to hold a firearm, then you are probably too dangerous to walk the street, and civil commitment is the correct answer that the law has always supplied.

What Hemani Demands: Process Before Deprivation

Here is where the Hemani decision changes the terrain. The Supreme Court did not treat the timing of disarmament as an afterthought; it made process central. Reviewing the historical analogues the government offered, the Hemani majority observed that a vagrant could be jailed “generally only upon a conviction,” a habitual drunkard civilly committed “usually only after proceedings before something like a probate court,” and a surety demanded only after “a proceeding before a justice of the peace.” Each required process before the loss of liberty. The Court then said that: “None of that holds true for § 922(g)(3).”

The Hemani Court explained that:

“On the government’s account, the statute automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user and until he ends his drug use­–all without any pre-deprivation process. To be sure, and as the government highlights, an unlawful user who violates this ban is entitled to “a full-dress criminal trial” before he can be imprisoned or permanently disarmed. Brief for United States 26. But be that as it may, §922(g)(3) offers an unlawful user no pre-deprivation process before his “‘temporary disarmament,’” the very burden the government says is akin to the burden vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws imposed on habitual drunkards.”

That was a defect, not a virtue. The Court pointedly contrasted sections 922(g)(3) with subsections (g)(1) and (g)(4) (the bans on convicted felons and those “adjudicated as a mental defective” or “committed to a mental institution”), which “involve some manner of pre-deprivation process.” A conviction. An adjudication. A hearing. The constitutional through-line is unmistakable: the government must give you your day in court before it takes your arms, not after. And the Supreme Court just said that in Hemani.

Rahimi Already Pointed the Way

The Hemani decision builds on United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), where the Supreme Court upheld disarming a man subject to a domestic-violence restraining order. The Supreme Court in Rahimi found: “An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.”

Chief Justice John Roberts flagged, in a footnote, that the objections to that statute “appear to sound in due process rather than the Second Amendment” but declined to reach the question because Mr. Rahimi never raised it. Hemani picks up the thread Rahimi left dangling and insists that due process come first.

The Red Flag Problem

Lay these principles against a typical red flag statute and the conflict is obvious. The order issues first; the firearms vanish; the hearing, if it happens, comes later (and at great financial and time expenses to the gun owner). That is deprivation before process, the precise sequence the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid when they bar the government from taking “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

Hemani adds a second demand these laws struggle to meet: an individualized finding about the dangerousness of the specific gun owner.

The Court faulted the government for not caring “whether [Hemani’s] drug use has ever made him a danger to himself or others,” refusing to let a categorical label substitute for proof about the particular person. Red flag petitions, built on allegation and prediction rather than an adjudicated finding of present dangerousness, run headlong into both requirements.

I have argued for years that physically-violent dangerousness must be proven in court before a neutral judge (not just asserted) and that the Constitution fixes the order of operations: notice of a hearing, then an actual hearing, and finally, if warranted, a deprivation of a constitutional right. Hemani now says this in the Supreme Court’s own words. Litigators fighting these confiscation regimes have a new and authoritative tool, and they should use it. Godspeed!

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About Mark W Smith

Constitutional attorney and bestselling author Mark W. Smith hosts the Four Boxes Diner Second Amendment channel on Youtube and Rumble; is a member of the U.S. Supreme Court Bar; and his Second Amendment scholarship has been cited by many attorneys and judges, including by attorneys in legal briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court. Professor Smith’s most recent book is ISRAEL DISARMED: What the October 7 Attack Teaches Americans about the Right to Bear Arms and he has lectured at Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, Princeton University, the Wharton School at U. Penn, and Oxford University. He is a frequent speaker at the Federalist Society’s Annual National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C.

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