Teaching Our Children Well: Bringing Gun Safety Training to K-12 Public Schools, iStock-1851057320
Dean Weingarten reported the Arizona Legislature is trying, once again, to make gun safety education mandatory in K-12 public schools. We should all wish them well. Republicans have a one-seat majority in the Arizona Senate and a six-seat margin in the House. However, Arizona Governor Katie Hobbs, a Democrat, is just as cuckoo for gun control as Michelle Lujan Grisham, her counterpart in New Mexico.
This is a shame: Ignorance is dominating public policy again.
Only three states, Tennessee, Utah, and Arkansas, currently require age-appropriate gun safety education. Tennessee was the first to take the plunge: Governor Bill Lee signed House Bill 2882 on April 23, 2024. On March 4 of last year, Arkansas House Bill 1117 became Act 229 when it was signed by Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders. Later that same month, Utah Governor Spencer Cox signed House Bill 104, completing the triad.
Kids in every state deserve the same benefits. At the very least, all the constitutional carry states should have similar requirements.
Of course, getting anything involving guns into public school curricula is going to be a challenge. The NEA will go ballistic: Every Chad and Karen at Hoplophobe High School will be grabbing pitchforks and torches to rail against what they consider the apocalypse.
These are the same folks who think disciplining a child for turning a Pop-Tart into a pretend gun is appropriate. Another example of zero tolerance being a fancy term for zero brains.
According to the CDC, there were 70 unintentional, firearm-related deaths among children ages newborn to ten in 2024. Sixty-one of those were children five years of age and younger. This doesn’t include non-fatal injuries, estimated to be two to four times the number of deaths. It also excludes violence-related deaths resulting from homicide, assault, or self-harm.
Those numbers tend to disappear when compared to the nearly 43 million youngsters in the 1-10 cohort. Nonetheless, the gun-grabbers think they’re sufficient to demand gun storage laws. Since education beats legislation, the numbers also justify the training programs.
One of the best things about the new training requirements is the requirement for neutrality. No GOA, no NRA, but also no Everytown, Giffords, or Brady.
The bill provides some specifics covering the new requirements:
“Beginning with the 2025-2026 school year, this bill requires each LEA (Local Education Agency) and public charter school to annually provide students with age-appropriate and grade-appropriate instruction on firearm safety. The instruction must begin with the earliest appropriate grade, as determined by the departments above, and must continue in each subsequent grade through grade 12. The instruction required must do the following:
(1) Teach students safe storage of firearms, school safety relating to firearms, how to avoid injury if the student finds a firearm, to never touch a found firearm, and to immediately notify an adult of the location of a found firearm;
(2) Be viewpoint neutral on political topics, such as gun rights, gun violence, and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
(3) Not include the use or presence of live ammunition, live fire, or live firearms.
HB2882, now Public Chapter Number 800, prohibits the approval of any curriculum, program of instruction, or any instructional materials that have brands or identifiable organizational connections.
It is difficult to imagine three states better-suited to be in the vanguard of firearm safety education in K-12 public schools. All three are permitless carry states; all three have minimally intrusive gun laws; all three have positive attitudes toward citizens’ rights and lawful gun ownership.
Arkansas, Tennessee, and Utah bear close watching. They are the laboratory when it comes to gun safety instruction. Other states can use their experience to create their own programs, and we should all be leaning on our elected state legislators and officials to expand this effort to as many states as possible.
Bill Cawthon first became a gun owner 55 years ago. He has been an active advocate for Americans’ civil liberties for more than a decade. He is the information director for the Second Amendment Society of Texas.
In a significant victory for Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., and a setback for shareholder activism targeting the firearms industry, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued an order on March 23, 2026, granting the company’s motion to dismiss a derivative lawsuit brought by four congregations of Catholic nuns. The case, Adrian Dominican Sisters et al. v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al., illustrates the high bar plaintiffs face when attempting to use corporate fiduciary-duty claims to challenge a company’s core business operations, particularly in a politically charged sector like gun manufacturing.
The plaintiffs, Adrian Dominican Sisters, Sisters of Bon Secours USA, Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia, and Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, U.S.-Ontario Province, own shares in Smith & Wesson and filed the suit derivatively on the company’s behalf.
Their core allegation: the board of directors and senior officers breached fiduciary duties of loyalty and care by “knowingly” allowing the company to manufacture, market, and sell AR-15-style semi-automatic rifles in ways that allegedly violate federal, state, and local laws.
This exposure, they claimed, subjected Smith & Wesson to massive potential liability from mass shootings in which the company’s products were used. A fourth claim alleged violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asserting that the 2024 proxy statement contained false and misleading statements about the board’s oversight of these risks.
The suit was not the plaintiffs’ first attempt. In December 2023, the same nun congregations filed an almost identical derivative action in the Nevada state court.
That complaint, drafted with assistance from Newman Ferrara LLP, painted a striking picture of alleged corporate misconduct. It cited Smith & Wesson’s continued promotion of its rifles despite their repeated appearance in high-profile mass shootings, arguing that the board ignored red flags dating back to a 2000 settlement agreement with the U.S. government and internal monitoring reports. The nuns contended that short-term profit goals trumped long-term risk management, violating the directors’ duty to protect stockholder value.
Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court quickly pushed back. In March 2024, it granted the defendants’ motion requiring the plaintiffs to post a $500,000 security bond under Nevada Revised Statute § 41.520. The statute allows courts to demand such bonds in derivative actions if there is “no reasonable possibility” the suit will benefit the corporation or its security holders. Finding the claims lacked merit and were more driven by social policy than by corporate welfare, the state court set a deadline of April 23, 2024. When the plaintiffs declined to post the bond, regarding it as an insurmountable barrier, the case was dismissed without prejudice. Undeterred, they refiled in federal court in February 2025, adding the federal securities claim to invoke diversity and federal-question jurisdiction.
U.S. District Judge Gloria M. Navarro’s March 23, 2026, order closely examines why the federal version fared no better.
Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which governs derivative suits, the court first addressed standing. Plaintiffs must (1) own shares contemporaneously with the alleged wrongdoing and (2) adequately represent the interests of similarly situated shareholders. While the nuns cleared the ownership hurdle, the court expressed serious doubts concerning the adequacy of representation.
Citing Nevada precedent like Cotter v. Kane, Judge Navarro weighed eight factors and found the plaintiffs’ “narrow personal interests in social change over financial gain” had a considerable impact against them. Stockholder proposals on related issues had garnered only 26–40.6% support, suggesting the wider shareholder base did not share the plaintiffs’ priorities. The court distinguished this from cases like the Starbucks activism litigation, noting that here the nuns appeared to oppose the company’s fundamental firearms business rather than seek governance improvements.
The decisive blow, however, came on demand futility. Under Nevada law, applicable because Smith & Wesson is a Nevada corporation, shareholders must either make a pre-suit demand on the board or plead with particularity why such a demand would be futile.
The plaintiffs chose the latter, alleging the entire board was interested or lacked independence due to ties to the gun industry and knowledge of the alleged violations. Judge Navarro rejected these arguments as conclusory. She took judicial notice of the 2000 settlement agreement (which explicitly disclaimed any admission of wrongdoing), monitoring reports, and the 2024 proxy. None, she ruled, established actual knowledge of illegal conduct or substantial liability risk. Mere “threats” of lawsuits or public criticism were insufficient to overcome the business judgment rule, codified in Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.138(3). The directors’ alleged commercial connections (e.g., one serving on a related board) were deemed too tangential to rebut the independence requirement.
For the Section 14(a) claim, the analysis was similar: no particularized facts showed directors were personally interested or that proxy statements contained material misstatements tied to actionable wrongdoing.
Critically, the court applied collateral estoppel to the bond issue. Because the state court had already litigated and decided the “no reasonable possibility of benefit” question under the identical statute, and the parties were in privity, the federal court required the same $500,000 security. Plaintiffs have 14 days to post it or face dismissal without prejudice. They also received 21 days to file an amended complaint, though the order strongly signaled reservations about their ability to cure the deficiencies.
This ruling carries wider implications. First, it reinforces the protective shield Nevada law provides corporate boards, especially in industries facing ESG-style pressure campaigns. Derivative suits are meant to remedy harm to the corporation, not to advance external policy agendas. Courts increasingly scrutinize whether plaintiffs truly represent stockholder interests or merely use their shares as a platform for activism. Second, it affirms the lasting strength of the business judgment rule.
Absent concrete evidence of self-dealing or conscious disregard of known legal violations, directors receive wide latitude, even when their company’s products are politically controversial. Smith & Wesson benefits from the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally shields manufacturers from liability for third-party misuse of firearms, a point implicitly bolstering the board’s position.
For the gun industry, the decision is a clear win. Smith & Wesson, which relocated its headquarters from Massachusetts to Tennessee in recent years to escape stricter regulatory conditions, can continue to emphasize its core business without the distraction of protracted litigation. The nuns’ attorneys have framed the suit as a novel attempt to hold boards accountable for “assault rifle” marketing, but courts have repeatedly declined to let derivative actions operate as vehicles for gun-control policy.
Yet the story is not entirely over. The plaintiffs may amend, and similar activist efforts, often backed by socially responsible investment funds or faith-based groups, continue across corporate America. The case also spotlights the growing use of shareholder proposals and derivative suits to push environmental, social, and governance (ESG) agendas. While some view this as legitimate stewardship, others see it as an improper weaponization of corporate law against lawful businesses.
In the end, Judge Navarro’s order reaffirms a fundamental principle: boards exist to maximize stockholder value within the bounds of law, not to bend to every social cause.
For the Adrian Dominican Sisters and their fellow plaintiffs, the way forward now requires either posting the bond, drafting a far more particularized amended complaint, or accepting that their vision of corporate responsibility may not align with Nevada law or Smith & Wesson’s shareholders. The firearms industry, meanwhile, receives another judicial indication that courts will not lightly second-guess lawful commerce, even when it involves controversial products.
About John Crump
Mr. Crump is an NRA instructor and a constitutional activist. John has written about firearms, interviewed people from all walks of life, and on the Constitution. John lives in Northern Virginia with his wife and sons, follow him on X at @crumpyss, or at www.crumpy.com.
Tennessee Advances Bill Blocking Landlords from Disarming Tenants, iStock-2182458189
On March 16, 2026, the Tennessee Legislature transmitted Bill SB0350 to Governor Bill Lee. Governor Bill Lee is expected to sign the legislation. Governor Lee signed a Constitutional Carry Bill in 2021. Bill SB0350 guarantees renters’ rights to keep and bear arms will not be subject to cancellation by rental contracts. The bill does not apply to state and federal government leases or rentals of property. The bill applies to both residential and commercial renters. While Governor Lee is expected to sign SB0350, if he does not veto the bill by the 28th of March, the bill will become law without his signature.
The Tennessee Senate passed the bill on February 27, 2026, by a vote of 27 to 5. The Tennessee House followed with a 72 – 22 vote on March 9, with an amendment. The Senate concurred with the amendment on March 12, 32 -0. Governor Lee is term-limited in Tennessee. His term will expire when a new governor takes office in January of 2027. From the bill:
SECTION 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 66, Chapter 7, is amended by adding the following as a new section:66-7-113.
(a) On and after July 1, 2025, a landlord shall not prohibit a tenant or a tenant’s guest from lawfully possessing, carrying, transporting, or storing a firearm, any part of a firearm, or firearm ammunition in the tenant’s home, apartment, or business; in a vehicle located in a parking area provided for tenants or tenants’ guests by the landlord of the leased premises; or in other locations controlled by the landlord as necessary to enter or exit the tenant’s home, apartment, or business, to enter or exit the leased premises, or to enter or exit a vehicle located on the leased premises or in a parking area provided by the landlord for tenants or tenants’ guests.
The bill provides for remedies if the landlord insists on prohibiting firearms. A renter who has been damaged may file a civil lawsuit against a landlord for “actual damages, punitive damages, and recovery of attorney fees”. New leases may be placed into effect by July 1, 2026, as long as existing lease provisions against firearms are not enforced.
The major effect of such bills is to remove from landlords any liability for damages that could be claimed in the event of the use of firearms on the landlord’s property, even when rented to another person. Because those who wish the population disarmed have failed to do so legislatively and judicially, the mechanism of civil suits has been employed to create bans that would otherwise be considered ridiculous.
Through zoning and the threat of lawsuits, landlords have been required to provide all sorts of services that they might otherwise not be required to do. This is part of the reason for increasing housing costs. Bills such as SB0350 do not require action on the part of landlords; they require inaction.
An armed public is considered to be in the interest of the Republic. Actions making it difficult to maintain an armed public are thus against the interests of governments in the United States.
In reality, such bans are extremely difficult to enforce. They are primarily used to allow landlords to remove unwanted tenants. Failure to pay rent or damage to property should remain the primary reason to remove unwanted tenants.
Dean Weingarten has been a peace officer, a military officer, was on the University of Wisconsin Pistol Team for four years, and was first certified to teach firearms safety in 1973. He taught the Arizona concealed carry course for fifteen years until the goal of Constitutional Carry was attained. He has degrees in meteorology and mining engineering, and retired from the Department of Defense after a 30 year career in Army Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation.
Christopher Gill’s Michigan self-defense case highlights the danger posed by carry bans in so-called “sensitive places.” iStock-1454441872
A licensed concealed carry holder in Michigan is now facing punishment not because prosecutors say he committed a crime in his defensive gun use, but because the state says he was armed in the wrong place when he needed that gun the most. That is exactly why so-called “sensitive places” laws remain one of the most dangerous and constitutionally suspect fronts in the post-Bruen Second Amendment fight.
According to Fox 2 Detroit’s reporting, Genesee County prosecutors determined that 23-year-old Christopher Gill acted in lawful self-defense after being attacked inside a restroom at Ballenger Fieldhouse on the campus of Mott Community College during a day of basketball games. Prosecutors say Gill was confronted by a group, restrained, and punched several times. During the assault, Gill managed to reach into his hoodie pocket, where he had a handgun, and fired one shot through the hoodie, striking Malik Zamir Henderson. Prosecutor David Leyton ruled the shooting was lawful self-defense.
Today’s example of draconian gun laws hurting crime victims is brought to you by prosecutors in Flint, MI.
Henderson was charged with gang membership, assault with intent to rob while unarmed, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Gill, by contrast, was not charged over the shooting itself. Instead, he was charged with carrying a concealed handgun in a sports arena, a Michigan law lists a “sports arena or stadium” among the places where a concealed pistol license holder may not carry concealed. For a first offense, Michigan law provides for a civil infraction, a fine of up to $500, and a six-month license suspension; state guidance also says the pistol is subject to immediate seizure if carried concealed in a prohibited area.
That split outcome should get the attention of every gun owner in America. The government’s position here is effectively this: yes, you were lawfully defending yourself against a violent assault, but you still should not have been armed when the attack happened because the legislature had already declared that location a “sensitive place.” That insane theory collapses the moment it meets real life. The danger to Gill did not disappear because he was inside an athletic facility. The criminal assault did not stop because the law supposedly made the venue special.
The only thing the location-based ban changed was that it exposed a licensed concealed carry holder to punishment after he survived the kind of attack that proves why the right to bear arms exists in the first place.
This is also why the recent Texas ruling on similar bans matters. In Ziegenfuss v. Martin, a federal judge upheld Texas restrictions on carrying firearms at racetracks, at businesses deriving 51 percent or more of their income from on-premises alcohol sales, and at premises where high school, collegiate, professional, or interscholastic sporting events are taking place. As the AmmoLand report on that case explained, the court acknowledged that the conduct still falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment, and even recognized there is “no carve out” from the Bruen framework for sensitive places, but still concluded Texas had shown enough historical analogues to keep the bans in place.
That is where these cases become so troubling for gun owners. Once courts allow governments to stretch the “sensitive places” label beyond the narrow, historically grounded examples discussed in Bruen, the category becomes elastic enough to swallow ordinary public life. A school event becomes the same as a school. A sports arena becomes just another place the state can wall off from the right to bear arms. A restaurant, bar district, racetrack, fairground, or entertainment venue becomes subject to disarmament-by-analogy.
The result is predictable: the law-abiding are told to go unarmed into exactly the kinds of public places where robberies, gang violence, and spontaneous attacks still occur.
Prosecutors say a licensed citizen was cornered and assaulted by multiple men in a restroom during a public sporting event. Gill survived because he was armed and able to defend himself; prosecutors themselves say his use of force was lawful. Yet the state still insists that the true offense was his decision to be armed in the first place. That is not a compelling defense of public safety. It is an indictment of a legal regime that treats the presence of a lawful gun owner as the problem, even after the facts show the actual threat came from violent attackers.
Under N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the burden is supposed to be on the government to show that modern firearm restrictions are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Supreme Court identified a few examples of places that had historically been treated differently, such as legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses, while warning against expanding that concept to all places of public congregation.
The more courts drift from that warning, the more they risk turning a limited historical exception into a broad license for governments to disarm ordinary citizens in the very spaces where they move through daily life.
Michigan’s sensitive places carry ban may be on the books, but cases like this show why such bans deserve renewed constitutional scrutiny.
A right that disappears whenever a citizen enters a gym, stadium, arena, or event venue is not much of a right at all. Violent criminals do not respect “sensitive place” signs. Predators do not call time out because lawmakers declared a building special. And when a lawful citizen is forced to defend his life in one of those places, the state should not pretend the real issue was that he was armed and had the means to survive.
With No Clear High Court Guidance, Lower Courts Must Guess What “Historical Tradition” Means and How to Use It. iStock-Bill Chizek-1149364911.jpg
Pro-Second Amendment groups, industry leaders, and attorneys often argue that getting the U.S. Supreme Court to issue a ruling that strengthens the natural law right of the people to keep and bear arms is a glacially slow, systematic, and intricate process.
That is, unfortunately, true. But why?
It’s true because the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice John Roberts, has orchestrated a judicial review process designed not only to slow the review of Second Amendment cases but also to indefinitely impede the review of the most significant cases.
As Chief Justice, he sets the tone and theme of the Court. It’s simplistic to think of Roberts as just one of nine Justices with equal say in the handling of cases that come before the Court on a petition for review.
Yes, he has one vote to grant or deny review of a case, as do each of the other eight Justices, but he has a profound say concerning the cases to be voted on. See, e.g., the article in “Legal Clarity.”
“The Chief Justice influences the Court’s docket, the list of cases the Court will hear. While any four justices can vote to grant certiorari and hear a case, the Chief Justice’s vote can hold outsized influence in this selection process.”
Some may argue that any Second Amendment case that the High Court takes up is reason for elation because all cases involving the fundamental natural law “right of the people to keep and bear arms”, are important, significant, momentous, noteworthy, consequential, epoch-making.” But qualification of the terminology is necessary to understand why Roberts will allow review of Second Amendment cases with a very narrow focus, while avoiding granting review of those that warrant special scrutiny.
Sure, the Court has reviewed Second Amendment cases in the period following Bruen, and it is doing so now.
But more to the point, there are Second Amendment cases that warrant special scrutiny because they involve issues of broad scope, clarifying the High Court’s rulings in Heller, McDonald, and Bruen.
Other Second Amendment cases warrant special scrutiny because they involve issues evidencing state disregard of or blatant defiance of the Court’s rulings in its landmark cases.
It is these cases that are, in fact, momentous. They, too, would deserve the appellation of “landmark cases.” Yet it is these kinds of cases that Roberts is averse to.
This is unconscionable and shows dereliction of his duty to diligently focus the Court’s attention on the most significant of Second Amendment cases.
If Roberts cherished the sacred right of the people [i.e., the American people] to keep and bear arms, he would have made this known to the Associate Justices. Evidently, he doesn’t. But why?
Had he done so, by encouraging the review of those Second Amendment cases of great importance, with expansive reach and impact, this would have signaled to the eight Associate Justices his strong commitment to advancing Supreme Court law and jurisprudence in that area.
This would yield rulings that can justifiably carry the appellation of Fourth and Fifth Landmark Second Amendment cases. We have two in mind, which we have written extensively about: Antonyuk vs. James and Snope vs. Brown, that came to the Court in 2025. The Court denied review of both.
Roberts could have garnered the four votes required to take up these two cases if he had only expressed a keen interest to the Associate Justices to do so.
The Chief Justice has had ample opportunity, but ever since the publication of the Third Landmark case, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association vs. Bruen, in June 2022, Roberts has used his influence, as Chief Justice, to prevent review of a petition that has the potential of yielding another landmark ruling.
This is no accident, nor evidence of incompetence. It demonstrates raw and deliberate sabotage of our Nation’s most sacred right.
To be sure, the Court has granted review of Second Amendment cases in the last few years, and a decision is pending in one of them, Wolford vs. Lopez, which we have discussed in previous articles.
While the Court agreed to review Wolford, Roberts consciously omitted from the Court’s consideration the most pressing of the two issues stated in the petition.
The crucial issue in Wolford explicitly asks the Court to explicate use of the new standard for reviewing challenges to state action that negatively impact exercise of the Second Amendment right.
Amplification, explication, and clarification of the new test were required once the High Court provided an inkling of it in the First Landmark Second Amendment case, District of Columbia vs. Heller (2008).
The Court pointed to the need for a new standard of review, having shown the flaws inherent in “interest-balancing” and alluding obliquely to a substitute test predicated on text and historical tradition.
Some scholars, not without reason, deny the Court had declared a new standard of review in Heller.
Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions agreed with that assessment and reverted to the use of “interest-balancing.”
In Heller, the Supreme Court stated only that the lowest rung of that standard—“Rational Basis”—is not to be used where an enumerated, fundamental right is involved. Yet, that statement is found only in a footnote to the majority opinion.
These lower courts presumed the Supreme Court in Heller discussed, in dicta, problems associated with the old “interest-balancing” test, awaiting the crafting of a new standard by the High Court at a later date.
But it took over a decade for the Chief Justice to act. The Court discussed at length its new judge-made rule, “Historical Tradition,” in Bruen. It asserted that “the Government must show that the restriction ‘is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’”
But that statement raised more questions than it answered.
The Court laid out the broad contours of the new standard. The Bruen descriptor demonstrated parameters for court analysis of the constitutionality of state action impacting the Second Amendment, but the test lacked operational effectiveness. More work was needed.
Specifically, a formal ruling on correct application of the standard would be required, resulting in another monumental Second Amendment case.
But that never happened, leaving a quagmire in all the appellate jurisdictions.
Oddly, horribly, the Supreme Court demonstrated its own befuddlement in another case that came down two years later.
The 2024 U.S. Supreme Court case, United States vs. Rahimi, reiterated the words of Bruen, but the opinion unfolded as a confusing assemblage of judicial perspectives on the import of the “Historical Tradition” standard, highlighting a disturbing lack of consensus even among the Justices, demonstrating the difficulty if not the impossibility of formulating an unequivocal expression of “Historical Tradition” that the lower trial and appellate courts could make use of.
Worst of all, the ruling appeared as an afterthought, reflecting what many Justices assumed before the fact about how the case should be decided—thus mirroring the major problem with the prior “interest-balancing” standard.
Without a ruling, a reviewing court cannot consistently and coherently apply the test.
You would think that Roberts would sit down with the Justices and hammer out a coherent, cohesive, consistent framework for use of “Historical Tradition” in Second Amendment cases.
But apparently, this hasn’t happened. Roberts adamantly refuses to allow the Justices to take up the issue in a Second Amendment case.
In the latest case, Wolford, which the Court did grant review, the Petitioners specifically asked for clarification of the new standard. Yet Roberts omitted it from formal review by the Court.
How can the Court rationally avoid providing a ruling and guidance on the appropriate application of the “Historical Tradition” standard? Answer: “It can’t.”
The Historical Tradition Standard issue arises in every Second Amendment case. It remains the salient focus of every case involving the constitutionality of a state action directed to and impacting the exercise of the right to armed self-defense. The issue cannot be avoided. The need to tackle it is a legal necessity.
Yet the Chief Justice either purposefully or reflexively refuses to allow the Court to deal effectively with it.
Roberts’s adamant refusal to allow the Court to clarify the “Historical Tradition” standard—the backbone of Second Amendment inquiry—leaves a vacuum in Supreme Court law, severely weakening the Court’s prior three landmark case holdings and reasoning.
This acute neglectfulness also injures the sanctity of our most vital natural law right, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”
Roberts must answer for his deliberate failure to provide necessary guidance in the use of the new standard of review.
Congress should look into this matter. It can start by instituting an impeachment inquiry.
Roger is an attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio and Arizona, and he is CEO of Arbalest Group, LLC.
He is a graduate from Cleveland State University, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, and was an Editor of Law Review, and he has earned a Master of Public Administration Degree from Cleveland State University. Roger also holds several degrees from The Ohio State University: a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy, a Bachelor of Arts degree in English, and a Bachelor of Science in Education degree in Secondary English Education.
Roger has worked as a high school English teacher and as a university administrative assistant. On earning a law degree he worked for several years as a Trademarks Examining Attorney with the United States Patent and Trademark Office in Washington D.C., and later worked as an attorney for a boutique intellectual property law firm in New York City.
Roger’s goal, working full-time on the Arbalest Quarrel website, involves preparing comprehensive and detailed analyses of case law pertaining to First and Second Amendment issues, and analyses of Federal and State laws and bills impacting the Bill of Rights, generally, and the Second Amendment, particularly.
Roger takes as axiomatic that, to maintain a free Constitutional Republic, our Bill of Rights must be preserved. If the latter falls, the former falls.
A federal judge upheld Texas carry bans at bars, racetracks, and sporting events in Ziegenfuss v. Martin, rejecting a Second Amendment challenge under Bruen. iStock-1295573667
A federal judge in Texas has upheld three longstanding state firearm restrictions, handing gun-rights advocates a disappointing decision in a case challenging whether Texas may continue treating bars, racetracks, and certain sporting-event venues as so-called sensitive places after N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
U.S. District Judge Mark T. Pittman ruled in Ziegenfuss v. Martin that Texas may continue banning the carry of firearms at racetracks, at businesses that derive 51 percent or more of their income from on-premises alcohol sales, and at premises where high school, collegiate, professional, or interscholastic sporting events are taking place. The court granted Texas’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion.
FPC LEGAL UPDATE: A Texas federal judge has upheld the state’s ban on carry in bars, racetracks, and sporting events while saying that Texans are “arguably among the most prominent protectors of our Second Amendment liberties.” You can read it here: https://t.co/X72s097g0h
The plaintiffs in the case were Charles Ziegenfuss, David Montgomery, Brian Robinson, and Firearms Policy Coalition. They brought a facial challenge under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments against Texas Department of Public Safety Director Freeman Martin, arguing that the state’s location-based bans violate the right to bear arms for immediate self-defense in public. Judge Pittman acknowledged that the conduct at issue does fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment, which should have put the burden on the government to justify the restrictions under Bruen’s history-and-tradition test.
That is what makes the ruling so frustrating for gun owners. The court did not say the Second Amendment stops applying in these locations. In fact, Pittman expressly wrote that “there is no carve out” for sensitive places from the Bruen framework. But after recognizing that the right is implicated, the court still concluded that Texas had shown enough historical analogues to keep the bans in place.
On interscholastic events, the court leaned on the proposition that schools are already recognized as sensitive places and then extended that logic outward. Pittman wrote that because schools are sensitive places, interscholastic events are as well. From a gun-rights perspective, that kind of reasoning is exactly the problem: once a court starts treating anything adjacent to a protected category as interchangeable with the category itself, the “sensitive places” doctrine becomes elastic enough to swallow large areas of ordinary public life.
The ruling on alcohol-serving businesses followed a similar pattern. The court said bars, restaurants, and other settings that predominantly serve alcohol have historically been treated as sensitive places, while also admitting places are not sensitive merely because they are crowded. Pittman pointed to what he described as two historical themes: restrictions in certain social settings and regulations involving the combination of firearms and alcohol.
At the same time, the opinion rejected some militia-related alcohol laws as weak support, noting those measures were about keeping militiamen fit for service, not disarming ordinary citizens. Even so, the court still found enough analogous history to uphold the Texas 51% rule.
The most concerning part of the decision for the broader Second Amendment fight may be the court’s treatment of professional sports stadiums and racetracks. Pittman conceded those places are not sensitive simply because they are crowded, but upheld the bans by analogizing them to historical restrictions in fairs, markets, ballrooms, circuses, shows, and other “social places of amusement.” The opinion even pointed to post-Civil War concerns that gambling and horseracing could heighten tensions and increase the risk of violence. That kind of reasoning gives governments a roadmap to defend carry bans almost anywhere people gather for recreation, entertainment, or commerce.
There was also an unusual procedural wrinkle. Texas initially chose not to defend the merits of the challenged laws, arguing justiciability instead. Because the state declined to mount a merits defense of the Legislature’s enactments, the court appointed Professor Eric Ruben and former Fifth Circuit Judge Gregg Costa as amici curiae to defend the statutes. Those amici then supplied the historical defense the court ultimately accepted.
To be fair, the opinion does contain language gun owners can point to on appeal. Pittman recognized that sensitive-place laws likely fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore must still satisfy Bruen’s historical test. He also emphasized that Founding-era evidence should carry the most weight, with Reconstruction-era material serving only as secondary confirmation. One of the central appellate questions going forward will be whether the analogies used here are truly rooted in 1791 history or whether the court allowed later-era public-order regulations to do too much work.
Ironically, one of the strongest pro-gun passages in the opinion is the part explaining how courts are supposed to read history. Pittman admits the Second Amendment should be understood mainly through the Founding-era public meaning in 1791, not through whatever lawmakers were doing decades later in 1868. He also acknowledges that later evidence is only secondary and cannot contradict the original scope of the right. That is a serious point, because if Texas’s modern carry bans survive only by stacking up later public-order laws about fairs, shows, gambling, and drinking establishments, then the state is not really proving an original American tradition of those bans. It is asking the court to broaden the exception until it starts swallowing the rule.
The decision effectively blesses a method of constitutional analysis that starts with a real right, admits the right is burdened, and then broadens the “sensitive places” category through increasingly generalized analogies. Once a court says a school event can be treated like a school, a sports stadium can be treated like a fairground, and a modern racetrack can be treated like a historic public amusement venue, the limiting principle becomes hard to see.
Pittman closed by invoking judicial restraint and suggesting that if Texans dislike these prohibitions, they can change them through the political process. That may sound modest, but constitutional rights are not supposed to depend on whether lawmakers feel like honoring them. Courts exist precisely because some rights need judicial protection when legislatures refuse to provide it.
Here, the district court chose deference over a harder-edged reading of the right to bear arms. Unless a higher court reverses, Texas’s bans at these locations remain in force.
The timing of the ruling also makes the policy stakes impossible to ignore. On March 1, 2026, a gunman opened fire at and around Buford’s on West Sixth Street in Austin, killing and wounding many others before police shot him. Authorities publicly investigated whether the attack had a terrorism nexus.
The Austin attack exposes the weakness in the government’s broader theory. Violent criminals and mass killers do not avoid bars, entertainment districts, or crowded public venues because the law calls them “sensitive.” Disarming the peaceable does not magically make those places safe.
What the Austin shooting does show, in the real world, is that these are exactly the kinds of places where innocent people may suddenly need the means of immediate self-defense most.
A federal judge in Missouri ordered supplemental briefing in Brown v. ATF, a case challenging the NFA’s registration scheme and regulation of suppressors and short-barreled rifles. IMG Jim Grant
A federal judge in Missouri has ordered additional briefing in a closely watched challenge to the National Firearms Act, signaling that the case raises serious unresolved questions about the government’s post-tax treatment of National Firearms Act (NFA) firearms, as well as the Second Amendment status of suppressors and short-barreled rifles.
In Brown v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Chief U.S. District Judge Stephen R. Clark of the Eastern District of Missouri issued an order on March 24, 2026, directing both sides to file supplemental briefs on several threshold and constitutional issues before the court moves further into the case.
The lawsuit was filed after Congress, through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, reduced the NFA’s excise tax for most covered firearms to $0 while leaving the NFA’s registration regime in place. According to the order, the plaintiffs argue that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by keeping the registration system intact after stripping away the tax that had long been used to justify the statute. The plaintiffs also argue that the NFA’s regulation of short-barreled rifles and suppressors violates the Second Amendment.
In addition to individual plaintiffs Chris Brown and Allen Mayville, the lawsuit includes Prime Protection STL, LLC, and a coalition of prominent gun-rights groups: the National Rifle Association, Firearms Policy Coalition, Second Amendment Foundation, and the American Suppressor Association. The defendants are the ATF, acting Director Daniel P. Driscoll, the Department of Justice, and Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi.
Judge Clark’s order makes clear that the court has not yet ruled on the merits. It does not strike down the NFA, enjoin enforcement, or hold that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail. What it does show is that the court believes the case presents several “novel issues” that require focused briefing before the litigation can advance.
Court Focuses First on Standing
The first issue the court wants answered is whether the plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring the case at all. Because this is a pre-enforcement challenge, the plaintiffs are not claiming they have already been prosecuted. Instead, they argue that they want to engage in conduct involving NFA-covered firearms without complying with the NFA, but are refraining because they fear federal enforcement.
Judge Clark noted that, in a pre-enforcement case, plaintiffs must show that the threatened enforcement is sufficiently imminent and that they intend to engage in conduct “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” He specifically ordered the parties to address whether the plaintiffs’ claimed injury in Count I—the argument that Congress improperly exercised its enumerated powers—is tied to a personal constitutional interest or is instead a generalized grievance that federal courts cannot hear.
That question could be important. If the court finds the plaintiffs lack standing on that part of the case, it could narrow the dispute even if the broader Second Amendment claims remain alive.
Judge Orders Briefing on “Common Use” and “Dangerous and Unusual”
The court also wants more briefing on how modern Second Amendment doctrine applies to the NFA’s regulation of short-barreled rifles and suppressors.
Citing District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Judge Clark laid out the familiar framework: when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects it, and the government must then justify its regulation by showing it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
But the court wants the parties to dig deeper into one of the most disputed questions in post-Bruen gun litigation—what exactly Heller’s “common use for a lawful purpose” language means.
Judge Clark ordered briefing on whether “common use” is mainly a statistical inquiry, meaning how widespread a firearm or item is among law-abiding Americans, or whether it is better understood as part of the inquiry into whether a weapon is “dangerous and unusual.” He also wants the parties to address whether the “common use” inquiry belongs at Bruen’s first step or second step, and who bears the burden at the first step.
Those are not small questions. How the court answers them could affect how lower courts analyze not just SBR restrictions, but other modern arms-related challenges as well.
Suppressors Get Their Own Threshold Question
One of the most notable portions of the order deals specifically with suppressors. Judge Clark directed the parties to address whether suppressors are actually “Arms” under the original public meaning of the Second Amendment. In doing so, the order cites several cases describing silencers as accessories rather than weapons in themselves.
That does not mean the court has adopted that view, but it shows that the suppressor portion of the case may turn first on a threshold definitional question before the court ever reaches historical analogues or broader constitutional balancing.
For gun-rights advocates, that issue is critical because suppressor litigation has increasingly focused on whether these devices should be treated as protected arms, protected components of arms, or merely regulated accessories outside the Amendment’s core protection.
Court Also Raises “Shall-Issue” and ATF Abuse Questions
The order also points to a more recent appellate development. Judge Clark cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Peterson, which held that the NFA’s registration regime is “presumptively constitutional because it is a shall-issue regime.” The Missouri court now wants the parties to address whether the NFA truly is a shall-issue system and, if so, whether such regimes are automatically or presumptively constitutional under Heller and Bruen.
Just as important, Judge Clark asked the parties to brief whether ATF has applied the NFA “toward abusive ends” through “exorbitant fees” or “lengthy wait times,” invoking language from Bruen’s footnote 9.
For now, the order should be read as a procedural development. However, it shows the court is taking a serious look at whether the NFA can continue to function as it has after Congress zeroed out the tax for most covered firearms, and whether the government’s regulation of suppressors and SBRs can survive under the Supreme Court’s current Second Amendment framework.
